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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
SMITH v. WAKEFIELD: IN BACK RENT ACTIONS, RESIDENTIAL 
LEASE AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO A 
CONTRACT UNDER SEAL TO EXTEND STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS OF THREE YEARS TO A LIMITATION OF 
TWELVE YEARS. 
 
By: Daniel W. Pei 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in actions for back rent, 
landlords are not permitted to convert a residential lease, typically subject to 
a statute of limitation of three years, to a contract under seal with a provision 
in the agreement which applied a longer limitation of twelve years.  Smith v. 
Wakefield, 462 Md. 713, 715 202 A.3d 1240, 1241-42 (2019).  The court 
found that such an application would be contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the State’s landlord-tenant laws.  Id. 
     In 2007, tenant Gregory Smith (hereinafter “Smith”), entered into a 
month-to-month lease agreement with landlord Wakefield L.P. (hereinafter 
“Wakefield”), for an apartment in Baltimore City.  In 2008, Smith was 
evicted for failure to pay rent.  In 2015, seven years after Smith was evicted, 
Wakefield filed suit to recover unpaid rent from Smith.  Although actions of 
failure to pay rent are typically subject to a three-year statute of limitations, 
Wakefield relied on the argument that the lease was a “contract under seal,” 
which has a statute of limitations of twelve years.  
     The District Court for Baltimore City ruled in favor of Wakefield.  After 
Smith filed a de novo appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City upheld the 
district court’s ruling.   The Court of Appeals of Maryland then granted 
Smith’s petition for writ of certiorari and reversed and remanded the case to 
the circuit court for dismissal of the complaint.  
     The Court of Appeals began by identifying the two statutes that could 
determine the limitation period of the case in question.  Smith, 462 Md. at 
717, 202 A.3d at 1242.  Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 provides 
a three-year limitation and Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-102 provides 
a 12-year limitation for “specialties,” with the relevant specialty found in § 
5-102(5), a “contract under seal.”  Id.  In determining which statute applies 
in matters of recovering back rent, the court examined Tipton v. Partner’s 
Management Co. See Smith at 717, 202 A.3d at 1243 (citing Tipton, 364 Md. 
419, 773 A.2d 488 (2001)).  In Tipton, the court found that CJ § 5-101’s 
limitation of three-years governs actions for back rent and that although the 
limitation can be waived, a contract under seal is not a sufficient waiver, and 
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refused to recognize it as such without the General Assembly’s legislative 
intent to change the three-year period.  Id. 
     The court specifically pointed to a line of dicta in Tipton that Wakefield 
relied upon in their argument.  Smith at 720, 202 A.3d at 1244.  Tipton stated 
that both parties of a residential lease with a seal that was affixed may agree 
upon a twelve-year limitation period.  Id.   Wakefield argues based on Tipton 
that, because the rental agreement in question had a seal affixed to it, the 
extension of the statute of limitations is valid.  The court was faced with the 
question of whether a rental agreement can be affixed with a seal for the 
purpose of extending the statute of limitations.  Smith at 721, 202 A.3d at 
1242.  
     The court first examined the history of the issue, and found that lease 
agreements for real property have traditionally been executed “under seal.”  
Smith, 462 Md. at 724, 202 A.3d at 1246-47.  However, despite the practice 
of executing leases under seal, Maryland has set the statute of limitations for 
all actions regarding debt and arrears of rent at three years since 1715.  Id.  
The court pointed out that in an opinion from 1972, the court observed that a 
lease executed under seal does not qualify as an “other specialty” with a 
longer limitations period.  Id.   
     The court then concluded that since these observations 50 years ago, there 
had been nothing to indicate any changes in the law.  Smith, 462 Md. at 726, 
202 A.3d at 1248.  The court examined the revision of the statutes and 
explained that the purpose of such actions is done without the intent of 
altering the law.  Id.  Although the revision has made a few substantive 
changes, the director of the Code Revision Commission did not include 
allowing back rent to be subject to a ten-year period within these changes.  
Id.  The court found that although a tenant may agree to waive certain rights 
and remedies through the lease agreement, the nature of the landlord/tenant 
relationship and protections offered to tenants has increased over time, 
including the prohibition of waiver of rights and remedies under applicable 
law.  Smith, 462 Md. at 734-35. 202 A.3d at 1252-53.  
     Lastly, the court referenced the inconsistencies between the outcome and 
the dicta of Tipton, which Wakefield relied upon in his argument.  Smith, 462 
Md. at 734, 202 A.3d at 1252.  Although Wakefield argued that Tipton might 
have left the door open for the possibility of modifying the statute of 
limitations through a lease agreement, Tipton was only attempting to uphold 
the three-year statute of limitations.  Id.  The court explained that the outcome 
of Tipton, the legislative intent, and history of the law regarding this issue, 
the specific line relied upon by Wakefield and the lower courts, was merely 
dicta.  Id. 
     As a result, the court found that the three-year statute of limitations is not 
a waivable “right” by contract under Md. Real Property § 8-208(d).  Smith, 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 50.1 70 
462 Md. at 735, 202 A.3d at 1253. The court emphasized that tenants have a 
right to be free from litigation and that the three-year limitation period is 
provided by law to protect that right.  Id.  The court also analyzed whether 
the statute of limitations is modifiable under factors outlined in Ceccone v. 
Carroll Home Services, LLC. Smith, at 735, 202 A.3d at 1253 (citing 
Ceccone, 454 Md. 680, 165 A.3d 475 (2017)).  Ceccone suggested four 
factors to consider whether an agreement can waive or modify the three-year 
limit to a longer limitation period.  Id.  The court found that the length of the 
modified period of limitation to twelve years compared to the three-year 
limitation period, the imbalance in bargaining powers between landlords and 
tenants, and the subject matter of the contract, a lease agreement, were not 
favorable to modification.  Id. at 736, 202 A.3d at 1253 (citing Ceccone, 454 
Md. 680, 165 A.3d 475).  The court determined that the three-year statute of 
limitations is not modifiable under the Ceccone factors. Id. 
     The dissenting opinion argues that the Maryland General Assembly does 
not specifically prohibit the application of a specialty statute of limitations to 
residential lease agreements, as it is not exempt from being considered as 
such.  Smith, at 742, 202 A.3d at 1256-57.  Furthermore, the dissenting 
opinion points to the lack of clarity of the General Assembly’s decisions 
regarding this issue.  Id.  The dissent would rather defer to the General 
Assembly, as they have the ultimate authority regarding the statute of 
limitations.  Smith, at 742, 202 A.3d at 1256-57.  Lastly, the dissent argues 
that the application of the statute of limitations as a right or remedy stated in 
RP § 8-208 was erroneous.  Id. at 745-47, 202 A.3d at 1258-60. 
     In Smith, the Court of Appeals held that a residential lease agreement 
could not be applied with a specialty seal in order to extend the statute of 
limitations for cases arising from back rent.   By issuing this opinion, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to allow landlords to use the fact that 
a lease agreement is contracted “under seal” to extend the statute of 
limitations for back rent suits from three years to twelve. The outcome of this 
decision will create additional protections for tenants and offer more 
equitable outcomes in the historically landlord-favored rent court cases.   
     The decision of Smith continues to expand the protections offered to 
tenants in the context of back rent and offer some additional protections to a 
historically landlord-favored area of law.  Practically speaking, Smith allows 
future tenants to more easily raise the statute of limitations as a defense from 
being sued by landlords for back rent.
